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I. INTRODUCTION
It was described as a movement "in search of a doctrine."' The
"movement" was that of liability without fault on the part of provi-
ders of defective products, and the "doctrine" it eventually discov-
ered resided in the domain of tort law. Whatever the terminology,
"strict products liability" has turned great turbulence in traditional
torts teachings in recent times.
The precept was not always so popular. The first Restatement of
the Law of Torts declared no such principle, and the prerequisite of
negligence then ruled the day. Even so, straws of other sentiments
were propelled about in the judicial winds. The restriction of priv-
ity, the expansion of res ipsa loquitur, special rules for foodstuffs,
and jumping warranties-these liability producing tendencies are
well remembered.
The more frontal attacks upon the existing order were perhaps as
famous for their personalities as for their content. For instance,
there was the early eloquence of Justice Traynor's legendary concur-
ring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.2 This was followed
by the later persistence of Dean Prosser's analytical musings over
endangered citadels.' Finally, the early 1960's yielded a few striking
decisions from a few influential state courts;4 by far the most illus-
trious of these was the California Supreme Court's unanimous dec-
* Regents' Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
This was the characterization employed by the authors for a section title in C. GREGORY
& H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 584 (2d ed. 1969).
24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J.
1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966).
E.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363,
181 N.E.2d 399 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
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laration of strict tort liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. I Shortly thereafter, the Restatement of the Law of Torts Second
put the finishing touches on its then controversial "section 462A,"
which quickly and dramatically became the rule, or at least the
point of departure, in the great majority of American state courts.
All these milestones are commonplace in the literature, and no
useful purpose would be served by further elaboration of them.
Their sum total is the manifestation of a national change of mood.
Across a span of time, a legal system mirrors the sentiments of the
population it serves. Upon the eve of the 1970's, therefore, in a Louis
Harris survey of "America's Changing Morality," many suspicions
were confirmed when 68% versus 22% of the people polled sub-
scribed to the following conviction: "A manufacturer of unsafe
automobiles is worse than a mugger." '
II. GEORGIA: IN THE BEGINNING
Against the national backdrop, Georgia strict products liability
history is more current, less explainable, and most intriguing.7 With
its penchant for codification, the General Assembly long ago en-
acted the following statutory acorn:
No privity is necessary to support an action for a tort; but if the
tort results from the violation of a duty, itself the consequence of
a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and privies
to that contract, except in cases where the party would have had
a right of action for the injury done, independently of the contract.8
Whatever the intended thrust of this legislative expression, the
court of appeals viewed it as but "a codification of the common
law."9 Obviously, it manifested no imposition of liability without
fault. Many years later, however, in 1968, the legislature selected
this early statute as the subject of the following "amendment":
• . . and except as provided in Code section 109A-2-318. However,
the manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property,
59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
TIME, June 6, 1969, at 26.
For a tidy summary of that history prior to 1974, by an author obviously possessed of a
strong background in tort law, see Bell, Products Liability Law in Georgia: Is Change
Coming? 10 GA. ST. B.J. 353 (1974).
GA. CODE § 105-106 (1933). This language has been traced at least as far back as section
2899 of the Code of 1861. See Taylor, Georgia's New Statutory Liability for Manufacturers:
An Inadequate Legislative Response, 2 GA. L. REV. 538, 539 n. 4 (1968).
1 Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 458, 46 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1948).
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either directly or through a dealer or any other person, shall be
liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who
may use, consume or reasonably be affected by the property and
who suffers injury to his person or property because the property
when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasona-
bly suited to the use intended and its condition when sold is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained; a manufacturer may not
exclude or limit the operation hereof. 0
Among a number of possible observations on the 1968 statutory
addition," now known as "Code section 105-106," was the point that
it too contained no explicit mandate of strict liability. Although it
did not expressly require a showing of negligence, neither did it
expressly eliminate such a requirement. Primarily, it provided for
"tort" liability "irrespective of privity." Rather clearly, therefore,
if change in the Georgia law was forthcoming, guidance from the
appellate courts would be necessary.
Essentially, the ensuing judicial guidance appeared to counsel
one message: no change. Thus on several occasions after 1968, the
court of appeals was at pains to emphasize that Georgia was not a
strict liability jurisdiction.' 2 One illustrative such instance was
Stovail & Co. v. Tate,13 a 1971 case presenting an action by a school
girl who was struck in the eye by a rock from a rotary power lawn
mower. In rejecting the plaintiff's strict liability complaint against
the manufacturer and distributor of the mower, 4 the court of
appeals could hardly have been more emphatic:
Georgia has not adopted the doctrine of strict liability, a doctrine
under which a plaintiff need not prove negligence, a doctrine under
which the highest degree of care by a manufacturer is no defense.
If there is to be a departure in product liability law from "liability
for fault" to "liability without fault," it should be via legislative
enactment.'
With Stovall & Co. in 1971, therefore, the court of appeals ap-
peared firmly on record in several respects: prior Georgia law re-
quired a showing of fault for the imposition of product tort liability;
" 1968 Ga. Laws 1166. The entire statute now appears in GA. COnE ANN. § 105-106 (1968).
For such observations, see Taylor, Georgia's New Statutory Liability for Manufacturers:
An Inadequate Legislative Response, 2 GA. L. REV. 538 (1968), an article written in the wake
of the 1968 enactment.
" See, e.g., Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 385, 190 S.E.2d 815 (1972).
" 124 Ga. App. 605, 184 S.E.2d 834 (1971).
" The court affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
ls 124 Ga. App. at 614-15, 184 S.E.2d at 840.
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the doctrine of strict liability entailed no such requirement; that
doctrine could replace prior law only by legislative action; no such
action had thus far occurred. The Georgia Supreme Court was also
aware of Stovall & Co.-it denied the application for certiorari in
the case.
III. EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE
The court of appeals continued its performance three years later
in the historic case of Ellis v. Rich's, Inc. ' 6 That litigation presented
a claim for damages resulting from injuries suffered when hot oil
spilled on the plaintiff's legs from a tilting fondue pot.'7 Offering
expert testimony of the pot's "instability" and "unacceptable engi-
neering design,"' 8 the plaintiff mounted actions in breach of war-
ranty, negligence, and strict liability in tort against the manufac-
turer, distributor and retailer. The manufacturer, a foreign corpora-
tion, refused to submit to the court's jurisdiction; the case pro-
ceeded against the other defendants; and the trial judge granted the
defendants' motions for summary judgment. Affirming the judg-
ment, the court of appeals again declared that Georgia was not a
strict liability jurisdiction and quoted its prior language from
Stovall & Co.
Again application for review of the case was made, and this time,
explained the supreme court," "we granted certiorari to consider
whether the doctrine of 'strict liability' is applicable in Georgia."20
First, the court relied upon the works of Dean Prosser and section
402A of the Restatement (Second) to define this doctrine.
"Essentially," it said, the doctrine "eliminates questions of negli-
gence in tort actions and the Uniform Commercial Code defenses,
including privity, in contract actions for breach of warranty." ' The
court conceded the contrast between this precept and past Georgia
practice: "Georgia has adhered generally to the traditional concepts
requiring proof of negligence in tort actions and privity in contract
actions on warranties. '2 The issue was thus focused: Had past prac-
,S 132 Ga. App. 430, 208 S.E.2d 331 (1974).
" The pot had been manufactured in Taiwan, imported by the distributor, and sold by the
retailer. It had been purchased by a third party who then gave it to the plaintiff as a
Christmas gift.
,1 Objection went to the method used to attach the handle to the pot.
" Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975).
0 Id. at 575, 212 S.E.2d at 375.
21 Id. at 576, 212 S.E.2d at 375.
22 Id. at 576, 212 S.E.2d at 376.
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tice now been replaced by the modern doctrine?
The supreme court highlighted two legislative developments-the
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1962,3 and the 1968
amendment to Code section 105-106.24 These "are recent expressions
of the legislature establishing but also limiting the public policy of
this state in this area."25 The court then formulated the results of
these expressions. First, privity remains a requirement generally in
contract actions.2" The second formulation was the striking one:
"[T]he 1968 amendment to Code Ann. sec. 105-106 imposes 'strict
liability' upon the manufacturers of new personal property for injury
to persons and property as stated therein irrespective of privity."27
Although this conclusion corrected the court of appeals' opinion,",
it had no effect upon its decision: "[Aippellant cannot proceed
against appellees for 'strict liability' because none is a manufac-
turer." 9
In early 1975, therefore, with the supreme court's opinion in Ellis,
strict products liability of some sort had finally arrived in Georgia.
Preliminarily, it was at least noteworthy that the court had declared
new doctrine by way of pure dictum. For once it concluded that the
case was controlled by the 1968 statute, and held the statute applic-
able only to manufacturers, the court had resolved the litigation.
Although the impact of introducing new law into a jurisdiction
might be softened by dictum announcement, the attorney's task of
advising clients is thereby rendered difficult indeed.
Several slightly more substantive observations might be tend-
ered. First, the supreme court did appear to indicate that, within
the confines of the 1968 statute, questions of negligence were elimi-
nated. Both its definition of "strict liability," and its express
"correction" of the court of appeals, would seem to carry that
thrust. The specific point corrected, it will be recalled, was the court
of appeals' declaration that the doctrine of strict liability-"a doc-
2 This Code extended privity to "any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home . GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-318 (1962).
, 1968 Ga. Laws 1166.
23 233 Ga. at 577, 212 S.E.2d at 376. The court said these enactments precluded any judicial
extension of strict liability.
" The only exceptions are those enumerated in GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-318.
27 233 Ga. at 577, 212 S.E.2d at 376.
2 "Our conclusion that it does impose a degree of strict liability upon manufacturers
corrects a statement to the contrary appearing in division 2 of the Court of Appeals opinion
under review." Id.
Id. at 577-78, 212 S.E.2d at 376. The court of appeals' decision, affirming the grant of
summary judgment for defendants, was affirmed.
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trine under which a plaintiff need not prove negligence":"'-was not
the rule in Georgia. Mildly puzzling in this connection was the
supreme court's insistence throughout its opinion upon enclosing
the words "strict liability" within quotation marks. In an area this
sensitive, and an opinion this tentative, one might perhaps be for-
given for wondering whether the court was now ushering in a doc-
trine of "strict liability" which was somehow different from the
doctrine of strict liability.
Additional ironies surrounded the supreme court's performance.
On the one hand, for example, it was striking that the court had
decided to take this momentous step in a products case which al-
leged defective design rather than defective manufacture. Some
strict liability jurisdictions have considered defective design a more
difficult problem. 3' On the other hand, the court couched its adop-
tion of "strict liability" in a defensive posture, not to be extended
beyond the limiting confines of the 1968 statute. Clearly, additional
exposition would be necessary on a number of fronts.
Although not responsive on all fronts, the next episode to reach
the appellate courts, also in 1975, was Parzini v. Center Chemical
Co. There a restaurant employee sought damages from the manu-
facturer of a drain cleaner which consisted of almost pure sulphuric
acid. The plaintiff demanded recovery for injuries suffered when the
liquid squirted over him as he and co-workers attempted to force-
fully open its container. In its initial consideration of the case, the
court of appeals reversed a jury verdict for the manufacturer.2 The
court viewed Ellis to require that the statutory strict liability issue
be presented to the jury, and that "under merchantability may be
considered such questions as whether a drain solvent consisting of
95% to 991/2% pure sulphuric acid is unmerchantable and danger-
ous because too potent for ordinary use. '3
Taking Parzini on certiorari,3 4 the supreme court enumerated
some results of its decision in Ellis. First, the court reaffirmed that
under Code section 105-106 "the action is in tort and privity of
contract is not necessary,"35 and that "the claimant is not required
to prove negligence. '3 This does not mean that the manufacturer
U Stovall & Co., Inc. v. Tate, 124 Ga. App. 605, 614-15, 184 S.E.2d 834, 840 (1971).
3 See, e.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
32 Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., 134 Ga. App. 414, 214 S.E.2d 700 (1975).
Id. at 416, 214 S.E.2d at 702.
3, Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975).
35 Id.
31 Id. at 869, 218 S.E.2d at 581.
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is an "insurer," however, because the statute limits liability to prod-
ucts "not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use in-
tended." 7 Although this language of limitation is not the language
typically employed to describe strict liability in tort, 8 the court
construed it to dictate that "the plaintiff must show that the manu-
facturer's product when sold by the manufacturer was defective. ' 39
This limitation, however, does not include the additional limitation
"that the defective product must be 'unreasonably danger-
ous' "4 0-"to hold otherwise would discourage the marketing of
many products because some danger attended their use."4' This
rationale, the court elaborated as follows:
Many products can not be made completely safe for use and some
can not be made safe at all. However, such products may be useful
and desirable. If they are properly prepared, manufactured, pack-
aged and accompanied with adequate warnings and instructions,
they can not be said to be defective."
In this case, therefore, the question formulated by the court of ap-
peals-whether the drain solvent was dangerous-was "incorrect."4 3
Rather, concluded the supreme court,
Under Code Ann. sec. 105-106 the question is whether the product
was defective in its manufacture, its packaging, or the failure to
adequately warn of its dangerous propensities. If so, the question
arises here as to whether the user knew of the defect and the danger
it presented but proceeded unreasonably to use the product."
On the remand,45 the court of appeals praised the supreme court's
opinion as one of "admirable clarity and conciseness," and held it
to require a new trial. Strict liability in tort had not been charged
in the first trial, said the court, and the case had proceeded on a
negligence theory alone. 7 The court then stated the boundaries for
the new trial as follows:
Id. at 869, 218 S.E.2d at 582.
' As a contrast, the court referred to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
234 Ga. at 869, 218 S.E.2d at 582.
Id. at 870, 218 S.E.2d at 582.
"Id,
42 Id.
1 Id. at 871, 218 S.E.2d at 583.
Id.
'5 Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., 136 Ga. App. 396, 221 S.E.2d 475 (1975).
Id. at 397, 221 S.E.2d at 477.
" Id. "It is thus obvious that the doctrine of strict tort liability as it applies to this case
was not charged by the court. The evidence would have authorized such a charge, and the
plaintiff objected to its omission."
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The jury is first to determine whether the product was defective.
In this it has for consideration the manufacture, the packaging,
and the warnings connected with its use. If the jury finds the
product defective, it next considers whether the user knew of the
defect and danger, and whether his use of the product in view of
this knowledge was unreasonable. If so, the plaintiff may not re-
cover on this legal theory. Thus, contributory negligence applies to
the negligence theory of action, whereas assumption of risk applies
to the strict liability theory."
By late 1975, therefore, with the conclusion of appellate court
consideration of Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., the second step
had been taken in the exposition of a strict products liability doc-
trine for Georgia. Although numerous unanswered questions re-
mained," the outlines of a basic principle were now indicated. The
dictum declaration of Ellis was confirmed. The liability imposed
sounded in tort but did not depend upon negligence. Under the
statute, the liability declared was strict, not absolute. Although it
required a "defective" product, the defect need not render the prod-
uct "unreasonably dangerous." Although the doctrine was not af-
fected by "contributory negligence," the defendant manufacturer
could still take cover behind the plaintiff's "assumption of risk."
Two parting observations might be offered at this juncture. First,
Georgia is not the only strict liability jurisdiction to reject the re-
quirement that the defect must render the product "unreasonably
dangerous." The rationale for rejection elsewhere, however, sounded
in sympathy for the plaintiff-the requirement was viewed to "ring
of negligence" and thus to impose a burden upon the plaintiff which
was not in harmony with adoption of strict liability. 0 The Georgia
rejection approached from the opposite perspective-some useful
products are unavoidably dangerous, and manufacturers cannot be
made "insurers" of them. Secondly, although contributory negli-
gence is not, assumption of risk is a defense to the Georgia doctrine.
1 ld. at 399, 221 S.E.2d at 478. "The question under the strict liability theory . . . is
whether the product was defective in that there was a failure to adequately warn of its
dangerous propensities. If so, the jury should look to the evidence to see whether the plaintiff
knew these facts and nevertheless assumed the risk of its use in the manner in which it was
used, so as to bar him from recovery." Id. at 400, 221 S.E.2d at 479.
" For an equally sparkling treatment of much of this development, posing valuable specific
queries in respect to its possible extensions by the courts, see Note, Products Liability in
Georgia, 12 GA. L. REV. 83 (1977).
10 See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
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In order to qualify, however, the plaintiff's use of the product must
be an "unreasonable" one. Does this "unreasonableness" transpose
issues of negligence into the doctrine of assumption of risk in strict
liability cases? If so, does this render the Georgia "comparative
negligence" formula applicable to strict liability recoveries? If not,
does this mean that the plaintiff in such cases is absolutely barred
from recovery if guilty of "assumption of risk," but recovers all if
"negligent"? In that event, of course, erring plaintiffs injured by
defective products may well face the prospects of minute but crucial
judicial line drawing in future strict liability actions.
IV. DEVELOPMENT
Given the supreme court's view of Code section 105-106 as
"establishing but also limiting"'" strict products tort liability in
Georgia, the exact language of that statute assumes pervasive prom-
inence. Its provisions posit points of both departure and destination
for claims under the "new" doctrine, and upon its nuances hinges
success or failure. Yet again, therefore, familiar legal history repeats
itself: glittering generalities are eclipsed by the flashings of details,
particulars, and specifics. In the absence of further celestial guid-
ance from the General Assembly, moreover, these sightings must
continue from the judicial galaxy."2
A. "Personal Property"
Whatever the precept of liability declared by the code section, it
is directed only against "the manufacturer of any personal property
sold as new property. 53 Among the remarkably numerous points of
intrigue crowded within this brief declaration, one is the focus upon
"personal property," and already it has projected controversy.
Garrett v. Panacon Corp. 4 presented an action for personal injury
allegedly resulting from a fall on a wet floor caused by defective
roofing manufactured by the defendant.5 Contesting the plaintiff's
claim under Code section 105-106, the defendant argued that "the
roofing material had been incorporated into the realty prior to the
occurrence and thus was not personal property."" The court of ap-
Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 577, 212 S.E.2d 373, 376 (1975).
" One is reminded of the old common law chant, "May the force be with you."
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (1968).
130 Ga. App. 641, 204 S.E.2d 354 (1974).
This case was decided prior to Ellis, and thus was not resolved in strict liability.
130 Ga. App. at 643, 204 S.E.2d at 356.
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peals conceded the case to be one of first impression, and formulated
the precise issue as "whether the statutory phrase 'personal prop-
erty' includes or excludes items which have been affixed to realty."57
Expressing considerable consternation over the prospect that the
statute might "import the law of fixtures into the law of products
liability,""8 the court firmly rejected that construction. Rather,
we rule that it was the intention of the legislature in using the
phrase "personal property" to eliminate from the operation of the
statute the sale of buildings by those who might with respect to
them be regarded as manufacturers, and thereby to retain with
respect to the sale of real property the rules . . . requiring fraud
to overcome the normal rule of caveat emptor. Under this interpre-
tation, with respect to personal property such as roofing, it matters
not at all whether such is subsequently installed in a building. 9
B. "Manufacturer"
A second statutory particular, forcefully confirmed by Ellis itself,
is the limitation of liability to the property "manufacturer. ,60 Some
limitations are less limiting than others, however, and the court of
appeals may already have signaled a receptiveness to limiting this
limitation.
The plaintiff in Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co."' had purchased
a "porch swing kit," assembled a swing from the kit, and suffered
personal injury when the swing then collapsed because of a defective
hardware piece. 2 The plaintiff had purchased from a retailer who
in turn had purchased the kit in a sealed package from the defen-
dant." Seeking protection behind the "manufacturer" limitation,
the defendant explained that it had not constructed the hardware
components but had purchased them "from another company in a
11 Id. at 642, 204 S.E.2d at 355. The trial court had granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
" Id. at 645, 204 S.E.2d at 357. The court said that "products liability law in Georgia is a
patchwork of certain hurdles and uncertain remedies for an injured plaintiff. On top of this
complexity and in the absence of any requirement to do so, we decline to add yet another
issue of mixed law and fact, namely, whether or not the defective item has been or has not
been incorporated into the realty."
5g Id. The trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant was reversed.
60 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (1968).
"141 Ga. App. 175, 233 S.E.2d 33 (1977).
" The kit consisted of a sealed package complete with oak chair and hardware.
The plaintiff had also sued the retailer and was held to have stated sufficient grounds
for liability under "breach of warranty." Her action against the retailer under Code section
105-106 was unsuccessful, "because there is absolutely no evidence that Liberty manufac-
tured the swing." 141 Ga. App. at 175, 233 S.E.2d at 35.
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closed, plastic container for insertion in the swing kit." 4 The defen-
dant's argument prevailed in the trial of the case, with the court
granting its motion for summary judgment.
In considering the propriety of the trial judge's action, the court
of appeals indicated the significance of the quandary: "It is an issue
of first impression in this state as to whether one who assembles
component parts and sells them as a single product under its trade
name is a manufacturer of the entire product into which the parts
are integrated.""5 With a minimum of analytical fanfare, the court
proceeded to resolve this novel issue. The defendant, it concluded,
"did not act as a mere distributor selling products acknowledged to
have been constructed by others."6 Rather, it sold the product
under its own trade name which "causes the chattel to be used in
reliance upon its care in making the item ... ."67 Accordingly, the
court held, "an entity which assembles component parts and sells
them as a single product under its trade name is a 'manufacturer'
within the meaning of Code Ann. sec. 105-106 . ... "I Summary
judgment for the defendant was thus reversed.
C. "Natural Person"
Not only does the statute limit the class against which its imposi-
tion of liability is directed, it also restricts the category of those who
may partake of its potential protections. Thus, the liability declared
is "to any natural person" 9 suffering the prescribed injury. In sev-
eral contexts, the court of appeals has featured this restriction.
In American Sanitation Services, Inc. v. EDM of Texas, Inc.,70
one corporation sued another for damages allegedly resulting from
the manufacture of defective garbage collection vehicles.7' Affirming
the trial judge's dismissal of the tort contentions, the court em-
ployed a two-pronged rationale:
Not only is there some evidence to support the finding of fact that
the appellant suffered no damages, but also Code Ann. sec. 105-
Id. at 175, 233 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 179, 233 S.E.2d at 36.
Id. at 178-79, 233 S.E.2d at 36.
07 Id. at 179, 233 S.E.2d at 37. The court quoted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 400,
as follows: "One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another is
subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer."
141 Ga. App. at 179, 233 S.E.2d at 37.
00 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (1968).
139 Ga. App. 662, 229 S.E.2d 136 (1976).
7' The action was brought in both contract and tort.
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106 . . upon which the appellant bases his action in tort, by its
specified terms runs to the benefit of natural persons only. The
appellant is a corporation and not a natural person. 2
Another instance in which the court gratuitously went out of its
way to make the point was that embodied by Cobb Heating & Air
Conditioning Co., Inc. v. Hertron Chemical Co." There the plaintiff
corporation brought an action against the manufacturer of a floor
finish which exploded and damaged the plaintiff's property. Em-
phasizing that the plaintiff's allegations sounded in negligence,74 the
court added the following footnote: "No allegation is made of strict
liability under. . . Code Ann. sec. 105-106 presumably because the
appellant is not a 'natural person.'""
The tort action is not always the typical one, and the court's
reference to the "natural person" restriction is not always gratui-
tous. For example, a far more crucial consideration of the matter
was that devoted by the court to the claim in Independent Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Automotive Products, Inc.7" There the plaintiff corporation
had allegedly produced a defective auger, and was sued for personal
injuries suffered by the user. During discovery proceedings, the
plaintiff determined that a component part of the auger may have
contributed to the injury and filed a third-party complaint against
the manufacturer of the component." The court of appeals disposed
of the strict liability ground of this complaint in the following fash-
ion: "The appellant's cause of action for strict liability under...
Code Ann. sec. 105-106 was properly dismissed. This code section
specifically refers to 'any natural person,' which the appellant is
not." The prospect was thus raised that although a corporate final
assembler of a defective product might be held strictly liable to the
injured consumer, it could not pass that strict liability on to the
manufacturer of the component which caused the product to be
defective.
A final variation on the theme is illustrated by Mike Bajalia, Inc.
v. Amos Construction Co., Inc.79 That case presented an action by
a plaintiff in both his individual and corporate capacities for dam-
12 139 Ga. App. at 663, 229 S.E.2d at 137.
13 139 Ga. App. 803, 229 S.E.2d 681 (1976).
The negligence action was unsuccessful also.
7 139 Ga. App. at 803 n. 1, 229 S.E.2d at 682.
141 Ga. App. 518, 233 S.E.2d 874 (1977).
The complaint alleged both tort and contractual grounds of liability.
141 Ga. App. at 521, 233 S.E.2d at 876.
142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977).
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age to a building allegedly resulting from defective components sup-
plied by the defendant. 0 Again, the court viewed the restriction
under discussion as controlling: "There is no error in the court
granting Butler's motion for summary judgment on the strict liabil-
ity issue as to the corporate plaintiff, Mike Bajalia, Inc. Strict liabil-
ity is applicable only in actions by natural persons."'"
D. "Injury"
For or against whomever it may be employed, the liability de-
clared by Code section 105-106 is imposed to cover "injury to...
person or property." Beyond obvious bodily injuries suffered by
claimants in such cases as Ellis and Parzini, the nature of the loss
protected thus emerges as yet another statutory coverage conun-
drum.
In 1975, the court characterized the "sole issue presented" by
Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc.82 as "whether Long may recover
in tort against the manufacturer and seller of a new automobile for
damages to the vehicle itself arising from defects in the engine."
Construing the plaintiff's claim to be based upon negligence in man-
ufacture and repair,84 the court expressly disclaimed any concern
with breach of contract or warranty, "or with any kind of strict
liability under Code Ann. sec. 105-106."'8 For success in negligence,
however, the plaintiff must allege the breach of duties arising inde-
pendently of contract,86 "such as the duty . . . to use reasonable
Other strict liability issues in the case are discussed in the text, infra at notes 105-114.
" 142 Ga. App. at 226, 235 S.E.2d at 665. Strict liability was held to be available to the
plaintiff in his individual capacity.
One other possible ramification of the "natural person" restriction is still not clear. In the
litigation Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, discussed infra, at note 118, the defendant argued that a
plaintiff wife, in an action for the wrongful death of her husband, was not a "natural person"
within the meaning of Code section 105-106. In its consideration of the case, the court of
appeals appeared to reject this argument, observing that the husband who had used the
product was a natural person. 141 Ga. App. at 375, 233 S.E.2d 444, 448 (1977). When it took
the case on certiorari, however, and reversed on other grounds, see discussion infra, the
supreme court noted the defendant's argument, but said this point had not been discussed
in the court of appeals' opinion. 239 Ga. 657, 659, 238 S.E.2d 361, 364 (1977).
82 135 Ga. App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975).
Id. The plaintiff alleged that throughout his ownership of the car the engine ran hot and
blew out the liquid in the radiator. His alleged damages were repairs not covered by warranty,
time lost from work, loss of use of the car, diminution in value, and inconvenience.
" .e., "that General Motors negligently manufactured and that Jim Letts negligently
repaired the car." 135 Ga. App. at 294, 217 S.E.2d at 604.
Id.
" "It is well settled that misfeasance in the performance of a contractual duty may give
rise to a tort action . . . . But in such cases the injury to the plaintiff has been 'an indepen-
19781
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
care not to place in the hands of the consumer a 'product which may
reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting substantial harm
if it is defective.' "I' "Substantial harm," the court defined as
"'bodily harm,' injury to 'life and limb,' injury to others and dam-
age to property other than the product itself."' ' With this framework
as justification, the court affirmed summary judgments for both
defendants:
Here, Long's only damages claimed are economic; diminution in
value, and out-of-pocket expenses for repairs. While we sympa-
thize with Long for the aggravation and inconvenience he has suf-
fered because of the defects in the car, such inflictions are not
compensable elements of damages in this case, and his only rem-
edy for the pecuniary damages suffered is in contract. 89
In the Long excursion, therefore, the point from which the court
departed and the destination at which it eventually arrived were
separated by a distance of considerable disparity. Beginning with an
express disavowal of concern with either contract or strict tort liabil-
ity, it finished with a formulation which appeared to affect both. For
success in negligence, it explained, the duty breached must result
in a particular kind of harm. That harm did not encompass damage
to economic interests, it appeared to reason, and in this case the
only damages claimed were economic. Accordingly, it concluded,
the plaintiff's only available remedy was in contract, not in negli-
gence, and-if "only" means only-not in strict tort liability.
One year later, the court decided Long Manufacturing, N. C., Inc.
v. Grady Tractor Co.9 0 There the plaintiff corporation sued in tort
for the alleged defective design of a portable tobacco barn manufac-
tured by the defendant, which arguably caused the barn to collapse
after being moved over a railroad crossing." The only damage
claimed was the monetary difference in the value of the barn before
and after its collapse,92 and the plaintiff was awarded a verdict and
dent injury over and above the mere disappointment of plaintiff's hope to receive his
contracted-for benefit.'" Id. at 294, 217 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 295, 217 S.E.2d at 604. (Quoting from PROSSER, TORTS 643 (4th ed. 1971)).
Id. at 295, 217 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 295, 217 S.E.2d at 605.
140 Ga. App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976).
" "It is thus clear that the appellee's verdict must stand or fall on the sufficiency of this
witness' testimony as to negligent design, there being none as to negligent manufacture." Id.
at 321, 231 S.E.2d at 107.
,2 "There were no allegations of personal injuries, only the pecuniary damage suffered
through the collapse of the allegedly defective barn itself being sought." Id. at 320, 231 S.E.2d
at 106.
(Vol. 8:233
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-GEORGIA
judgment in the trial court. Reversing on the ground of an
"unwarranted charge" to the jury,93 the court of appeals also pur-
ported to treat both negligence and strict liability in the context of
the case. As to the former, the court said that "a cause of action in
negligence for property damage to the defective personal property
itself is cognizable under Code Ann. sec. 105-106." l' This precept,
the court advised, one should "compare with 'economic' damages
only . . .", citing Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc."5 As to strict
liability, the court observed that "here the only damage for which
recovery is sought is to the alleged defective personal property it-
self." This point was a crucial one, it explained, because "we do
not believe recovery in strict liability in tort can be had solely for
property damage to the allegedly defective property itself."97
In the long view, the analytical distinction between Long and
Long Manufacturing, Inc. was striking. In Long, the court deemed
damage to the defective product itself as economic in nature. This
characterization in turn precluded remedies in either negligence or
strict tort liability, and relegated the plaintiff to a claim in contract.
By Long Manufacturing, Inc., damage to the defective product itself
remained sufficiently economic to preclude recovery in strict liabil-
ity. As to a negligence action, however-even a negligence action
under Code section 105-106-"economic damage" was no longer the
concept it once had been. At no point in the entire opinion was the
feasibility of a contract claim even mentioned.
One year later, the court decided Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor.9" There
the plaintiff purchaser brought an action for the defendant's alleged
defective manufacture and repair of a new automobile,99 and sought
damages for cost of replacement, loss of bargain, lost interest and
wages, and attorney fees. The trial judge presented the case to the
jury "solely on the grounds of negligence and strict liability for
1-1 The trial judge charged the jury on the defendant's failure to provide "fasteners," and
the court could find no evidence to justify such a charge.
140 Ga. App. at 321, 231 S.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 321, 231 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 322-23, 231 S.E.2d at 107-08.
I Id. at 323, 231 S.E.2d at 108. The court cited a decision by the Supreme Court of
California, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), and
said that "the Seely decision has been cited with approval in Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile,
Inc."
141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977).
The plaintiff alleged his discovery of numerous defects in the vehicle and several unsuc-
cessful attempts by the defendant to repair them.
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manufacturers,"' 1 and the plaintiff recovered a verdict and judg-
ment. On appeal, the trial judge was held to have erred on both
grounds. First, said the court of appeals, the plaintiff alleged negli-
gent manufacture and repair, but
did not allege that this negligence caused any damage to his person
or property other than damages attendant to his receiving a vehicle
not up to the standards that he contracted to purchase; he simply
sued for loss of the benefit of his bargain. Such damages are not
recoverable in negligence. Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc. '
Secondly, the court focused upon the issue of strict liability: "We
hold that an 'injury' within the context of Code Ann. sec. 105-106,
does not include damages stemming from loss of the benefit of one's
bargain."'' 2 Rather, the court continued,
[a] manufacturer's duty to sell goods meeting consumer expecta-
tions is governed by the requirements of warranty law. Warranty
law, as set out in the Uniform Commercial Code, does not require
products that in all instances meet all consumers' expectations; it
is much more subtle. But if strict liability in tort were considered
to apply to the loss of bargains by disgruntled consumers, the
subtle and technical provisions of warranty law established by the
General Assembly through its enactment of the U.C.C. would be
useless."3
Finally, concluded the court, "because the appellee can not recover
as a matter of law under either negligence or strict liability in tort
theories, the trial judge erred in his denial of the appellant's motions
for directed verdict.' 0 4
With its disposition of Chrysler Corp., therefore, the court of ap-
peals had achieved a remarkable posture. Although the claimed
items of recovery seemed substantially the same, now they were
designated "loss of bargain benefits" rather than "economic dam-
ages." This change in terminology did not change the result in strict
liability, however-indeed, the court finally formulated a rationale
for that result. As to negligence, on the other hand, the court applied
141 Ga. App. at 671, 234 S.E.2d at 124.
Id. at 671, 234 S.E.2d at 124. This was the extent of the court's discussion of negligence.
102 Id. at 672, 234 S.E.2d at 124.
103 Id. Again, the court relied forcefully upon the California court's decision in the Seely
case: "This distinction between recovery by strict liability in tort and recovery for loss of
bargain in warranty is not arbitrary. The distinction rests on the nature of the responsibility
which a manufacturer must assume in distributing its products."
I'l Id. at 673, 234 S.E.2d at 125.
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Long and ignored Long Manufacturing, Inc. Thus, there could be
no liability in tort, and again the plaintiff was judicially counseled
in the "subtle" ways of contract law.
Less than one year later, the court decided Mike Bajalia, Inc. v.
Amos Construction Co., Inc.' 5 There the owner of a building
brought an action against the manufacturer of allegedly defective
building components, arguing breach of contract and warranty, neg-
ligent design, and strict liability in tort.' 6 Reviewing the trial
judge's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the court
agreed that Long dictated no recovery in negligence "for damage to
building components . . . arising from defects in these same compo-
nents." 7 At this point, however, the court drew a distinction: not
all the components used in the plaintiff's building were supplied by
this defendant.0 8 For damage to those other components caused by
defects in the defendant's components, 9 a negligence action was
available; and the trial judge had "erred in granting summary judg-
ment on the negligence issue." '1
Next, the court approached the issue of strict liability. To be
cleared from the plaintiffs glide path, it conceded, were the prior
decisions of Long; Long Manufacturing, Inc.; and Chrysler Corp.
First, the court tackled Long in the following fashion: "The strict
liability action, being predicated upon the breach of a legal duty, is
an action ex delicto . . . .Therefore, the reasoning of Long . . . is
not applicable to the strict liability issue.""' Second, the court dis-
posed of Chrysler Corp.: "Also distinguishable is Chrysler
Corporation . . .where this court held that an 'injury' within the
context of Code Ann. sec. 105-106 . . .does not include damages
stemming from loss of the benefit of one's bargain.""' 2 Third, the
court turned to Long Manufacturing, Inc.:
In Division 4 thereof we find the language, "We do not believe
recovery in strict liability in tort can be had solely for property
142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977).
' For treatment of other aspects of this decision, see discussion in text, supra at notes 79-
81.
142 Ga. App. at 226, 235 S.E.2d at 665.
" The most notable of these other components, said the court, was the roof of the building.
"' The court noted evidence that the defendant's components were not sufficiently strong
to support the roof thereby causing damage to it.
142 Ga. App. at 226, 235 S.E.2d at 665.
Id. at 227, 235 S.E.2d at 666. "Code Ann. sec. 105-106 ... imposes a statutory duty on
manufacturers of personal property, the breach of which gives rise to an action on a theory
of strict liability."
" Id. at 227, 235 S.E.2d at 666. This was the extent of the court's "distinction."
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damage to the allegedly defective property itself." But in that case
the plaintiff, a corporation and not a natural person, was suing for
negligence in the design and was not seeking judgment under the
Georgia strict liability statute; nor could it do so . . . .The lan-
guage in Division 4 is therefore obiter dicta, and does not control
this case in any manner. '
Finally, the way was clear:
The court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment of
defendant . . .on the strict liability issue . . . .In the case sub
judice, the plaintiff's strict liability action is not predicated solely
upon his economic loss, but is also based upon the physical injuries
to the building."4
Obviously, this tale of four cases is a trying one. Its mere recita-
tion is challenging; divining its ramifications is awesome. An effec-
tive taking of stock requires stock worth taking and here that re-
quirement is not fulfilled. A point of beginning, nevertheless, is one
last emphasis on the factual settings of the cases. Long (damage to
defective car); Long Manufacturing, Inc. (damage to defective
barn); and Chrysler Corp. (damage to defective car) were all viewed
as presenting claims for damages to the defective products them-
selves. Mike Bajalia, Inc. was seen to advance not only that claim
but one also for damage to other property caused by the defective
product. Any effort at assessment of the cases must take account of
this factual distinction.
One preliminary point for reflection is the status of the action
in negligence at this juncture. Although Long and Chrysler Corp.
both disallowed recovery in negligence, Long Manufacturing, Inc.
-intervening between those decisions-recognized such a right
of action. Mike Bajalia, Inc. appeared to subscribe to Long and
Chrysler Corp. in rejecting a negligence action for damage to the
defective components themselves. For damage to other components,
however, the latter case did recognize a right to recovery in negli-
gence.
As to strict liability, the results refuse to compute. Long strongly
indicated-and both Long Manufacturing, Inc. and Chrysler Corp.
expressly said-there could be no recovery in strict liability for the
damages in question. In Mike Bajalia, Inc., the court expressly rec-
ognized a strict liability action for physical injuries to the plaintiff's
Id. at 227-28, 235 S.E.2d at 666.
"' Id. This was in respect to the plaintiff in his individual non-corporate capacity.
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building caused by defendant's defective components. Whether the
court was now prepared to extend this action to damages to the
defective components themselves is simply unclear. Although on the
one hand it denigrated the obstructing language from Long Manu-
facturing, Inc. as "obiter dicta" and not controlling, it continued to
distinguish what it allowed in strict liability recovery from what it
still referred to as "economic loss." Whether that reference still
covers damage to the defective product, the court did not say.
Less crucial, perhaps, but analytically more infuriating, was the
cavalier disposition made of the first three cases by the court's opin-
ion in Mike Bajalia, Inc. The reasoning in Long was inapplicable,
the court explained, because the action in Mike Bajalia, Inc. was
"ex delicto." What does that mean? Does it mean the court thought
the action in Long was not ex delicto? If so, this is strange indeed,
because the court in Long expressly construed the plaintiff's claim
to be based on negligence-if a negligence action is not an action
ex delicto, then what is it? True, the court in Long counseled the
plaintiff to go to contract, but that does not change the nature of
the claim which the plaintiff there in fact presented.
Chrsyler Corp., the court said, was "also distinguishable." What
the court did not say was exactly where the distinction lay. At the
most, it appeared to point out that what Chrysler Corp. excluded
from "injury" under Code section 105-106 was loss of bargain bene-
fits. Perhaps this means that the court viewed Mike Bajalia, Inc. not
to involve such losses, but the court never explicated the legal na-
ture of the losses which the case did involve.
Long Manufacturing, Inc. was given a three-point treatment.
First, the court designated it as only an action in negligence. Al-
though of course this may be true, that point was not made clear in
that case. Also, if it is true, it makes all the more unexplainable the
court's completely gratuitous yet forceful statement on strict liabil-
ity there. Second, the court noted that the plaintiff in Long Manu-
facturing, Inc. was a corporation and, under other decisions, could
not bring an action in statutory strict liability. This was a late date
for finally getting around to announcing the true reason for a deci-
sion rendered a year ago, a decision which itself never even alluded
to this reason. Retroactive rationalization leaves much to be desired
in effectively resolving important litigation. Third, as already ob-
served, the court appeared to indicate that Long Manufacturing,
Inc. presented only a claim for "economic loss," and that Mike
Bajalia, Inc. presented more. As also noted, however, the court
never clarified what it now viewed "economic loss" to encompass.
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Finally, this series of decisions does no credit to the court of
appeals. If the court thinks the General Assembly was "subtle" and
"technical" in adopting the warranty law of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, perhaps it should attempt an objective reading of these
opinions. One need possess no substantive ax to grind in order to
urge more thoughtful treatment of basic legal issues. Had it pur-
posely set out to do so, the court would have been hard pressed to
more thoroughly boggle the bar.
E. Strict Liability and Wrongful Death
The final issue thus far unfolded in Georgia's development of
strict products tort liability portrays an intriguing instance of the
modern confronting the ancient. More than 100 years ago, the Geor-
gia General Assembly overturned the common law by expressly es-
tablishing a cause of action for the tort of "wrongful death.""' This
statute enumerates individuals in whose behalf the action is pro-
vided and declares them entitled to recover for the "homicide" of
the decedent. 6 The provision is then supplemented by the following
definition: "The word 'homicide' as used in this Chapter shall in-
clude all cases where the death of a human being results from a
crime or from criminal or other negligence.""' 7
In the recent case of Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, "" the plaintiff wife
sought to invoke the wrongful death statute against the manufac-
turer of the automobile in which her husband was riding when
killed. Alleging the existence of a defect, one of the plaintiff's com-
plaints was grounded in strict liability under Code section 105-
106. ''1 In return, the defendant's motion to strike was posited upon
the point that the wrongful death statute-requiring death from
criminal or other "negligence"-was not covered by the strict liabil-
ity statute, where no negligence is necessary for recovery.' 0 The
perplexity was thus neatly focused: Could the ancient provision for
wrongful death be accommodated to the modern demands of strict
products liability?' 2'
See GA. CODE ch. 105-13 (1933).
"' GA. CODE § 105-1302 (1933).
"t GA. CODE § 105-1301 (1933).
141 Ga. App. 371, 233 S.E.2d 444 (1977).
The plaintiff also alleged gross negligence against the driver of the vehicle, as well as
negligent design, manufacture, and assembly by the manufacturer.
20" The defendant's motion had been denied by the trial judge.
121 We thus have for decision the question of whether or not a wrongful death action
is allowed under the amendment of Code Ann. sec. 105-106 by Georgia Laws 1968,
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The court of appeals' response took the form of an opinion which
was remarkable from several perspectives. The court agreed that in
Center Chemical Co. v. Parzini'2 the supreme court had established
that proof of negligence was not necessary for recovery in strict
liability.2 ' Still, the court hedged: "But even though strict liability
in tort does not arise out of either common law negligence or breach
of implied warranty, it is a tortious action based squarely on the tort
concept of culpability or fault."'' 4 If this was mildly puzzling, the
court's next pronouncement went the limit: "The strict liability
doctrine is not liability without fault because the manufacturer is
not made the insurer of his products."'2 5 Rather, "if the manufac-
turer's product is defective, it amounts to negligence per se or as a
matter of law."'' 2 In clarification, the court summed up as follows:
Thus, the supreme court in defining the legal duty put upon manu-
facturers in Parzini, supra, has merely held that negligence in the
manufacture need not be shown, but proof must be offered that the
product was defective in itself, amounting to negligence as a mat-
ter of law (in itself, that is, per se), or what this court has pre-
viously referred to as statutory negligence as opposed to nonstatu-
tory negligence. 27
In conclusion, "it follows that an action for wrongful death may be
maintained under the strict liability statute.' ' 2
Even in the land of the unique, this opinion would constitute a
rarity. Essentially, it may be distilled-with parenthetical commen-
tary-as follows. Strict liability does not require proof of negligence,
but it is a tort action based squarely upon the concept of negligence.
(Was tweedle dum and tweedle dee ever so tweedled?) Further,
strict liability is not liability without fault. (From all the literature
of strict liability law, this statement is a find. Some have said that
strict liability is not absolute liability, because there are limitations
pages 1166, 1167, and as clarified by later decisions of the supreme court, under
products liability or strict liability as shown and defined therein simply because
negligence need not be proven. 141 Ga. App. at 373, 233 S.E.2d at 446.
"' 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975). See the discussion of this case in text, supra at
note 34.
' However, the court emphasized the requirement of a "defect" in the product.
121 141 Ga. App. at 374, 233 S.E.2d at 447.
125 Id.
' Id. The court relied upon BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY.
"z Id. at 375, 233 S.E.2d at 447-48.
"' Id. at 375, 233 S.E.2d at 448. The court also appeared to hold that the wrongful death
statute met the strict liability statute's requirement of injury to a "natural person."
19781
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
upon it. Some have said that establishing strict liability is virtually
as difficult as proving negligence, because of the complexities of
showing a defect. Some have said that recovery in strict liability can
be limited by a comparative negligence formula. But few indeed
have said that liability without fault is not liability without fault.)' 29
Finally, although it is not necessary to prove negligence in strict
liability, once the defect necessary to strict liability has been
proved, negligence per se exists. (That is, you don't have to, but
once you do, you have. This is an interesting use of negligence per
se. Ordinarily, this doctrine arises in the context of showing the
defendant's violation of appropriate criminal legislation in order to
set the standard of care in a negligence case.) Ergo, wrongful death,
which requires negligence, comes within strict liability, which does
not!
Taking the case on certiorari,'°3 the supreme court divided four-
to-two, and reversed.' 3' The majority opinion sought first to place
the controversy in context. Both statutes involved-the provision
for wrongful death and that for strict liability-were in derogation
of the common law, and thus must be afforded a strict construction.
The only theory of recovery provided for wrongful death was that of
negligence; thus, strict liability permitted wrongful death recovery
only if "the strict liability imposed under Code Ann. sec. 105-106
embraces negligence.' 3 In both Ellis and Parzini, the supreme
court had defined strict liability to eliminate questions of negli-
gence. Accordingly,
we hold that the strict liability imposed under sec. 105-106 is not
based on negligence. While negligence on the part of the manufac-
turer may happen to be involved as a matter of fact, in a given
situation, it is not necessarily so, and the statute imposes liability
irrespective of negligence.' 33
'" The closest analogy which comes to mind is the title which Professor Ehrenzweig con-
ferred upon his book, EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951), but he was making a
point, and everyone knew it.
Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977).
The court's opinion was written by Justice Bowles, with Chief Justice Nichols concur-
ring only in the judgment. Justice Hill wrote a dissenting opinion, with which Presiding
Justice Undercofler concurred. Justice Marshall was disqualified.
" 239 Ga. at 659, 238 S.E.2d at 363.
,33 Id. at 660, 238 S.E.2d at 364. Noting the rather unique terminology of Code § 105-106,
the court said "the result is somewhat hybrid. Clearly, there is no standard of conduct set,
nor any actual prohibition imposed in the Code section." Id. at 661, 238 S.E.2d at 364.
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Indeed,
a manufacturer can still be held liable irrespective of how carefully
he observes; or any degree of care, precaution or vigilance he ob-
serves, in trying to protect the interest of another. The statute
imposes strict liability for a defective new product and nothing
else.':"
The court acknowledged the modern judicial tendency to compen-
sate for harms ensuing from defective products, as well as the
"illogical" results of Georgia's provisions.' Still, the court main-
tained, the General Assembly was aware of the wrongful death en-
actment when it adopted the strict liability statute:3 '
We conclude that neither negligence as a matter of fact or per se
is involved in a cause of action brought under Code Ann. sec. 105-
106, whether brought separately or in conjunction with . . . [the
wrongful death statute]. With that, plaintiff's action for wrongful
death based on such a premise cannot stand. 37
Whatever the complications created, the court advised, "these
problems address themselves to the legislature and not to the
courts."
3s
F. Recent Legislative Activity
During its 1978 regular session, the Georgia General Assembly
confronted a plethora of proposals affecting the tort law of products
liabilty. Amid this flury of activity, several bills were enacted by the
two houses and presently await consideration and action by the
Governor. Although tentative, therefore, a brief description of some
of these measures might prove instructive.
13' Id. at 662, 238 S.E.2d at 365. "If negligence or lack of negligence is not involved, there
is really no need to consider whether or not a violation of the Code section would be negligence
per se." Id. at 661-62, 238 S.E.2d at 365.
1'3 The court said that at one extreme, "there is a cause of action for a scratch inflicted on
a person but no cause of action for his death," and at the other, "a manufacturer could
possibly be held responsible in 1977 for a defect in a motor vehicle manufactured in 1930."
Id. at 663, 238 S.E.2d at 365.
'' "Nowhere was negligence, wrongful death or survivors mentioned. We do not feel that
this court can, by judicial opinion, enlarge upon or by construction grant rights or causes of
action not clearly included in the statute itself." Id. at 663, 238 S.E.2d at 365.
17 Id. at 662-63, 238 S.E.2d at 365.
"I Id. at 663, 238 S.E.2d at 365. The dissenting opinion argued that the court should fill
the void in the strict liability statute, and lamented that "we are declaring our inability to
provide solutions to today's problems. We are forgetting our history and renouncing our
inheritance." Id. at 664, 238 S.E.2d at 366.
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Two of the enactments appear designed primarily to accumulate
information. One of these would require insurers to file annual re-
ports with the State Insurance Commissioner concerning product
liability insurance. ' 9 Information provided by the reports would
include the number of product liability claims during the period,
the amounts paid in discharging the claims, the amount of reserves
available to pay the claims, the amount of product liability insur-
ance premiums received, the number of insured persons, the num-
ber of cancellations or refusals to renew, and the number of insureds
who failed to renew.'4 The second enactment would require these
same items of information to be supplied in addition to the quart-
erly affidavits filed with the Insurance Commissioner by surplus line
brokers.' 4 '
The other three measures to be noted would all expressly amend
Code section 105-106.111 One of these appears to constitute the legis-
lature's response to the supreme court's decison in Ford Motor Co.
v. Carter' 3-it would expressly incorporate claims for death by suc-
cessors of causes of action into the statute.' It would also expressly
amend the wrongful death statute"' to provide such an action for
death resulting "from defectively manufactured property whether
or not the result of negligence.""'46
The second measure would permit a manufacturer sued under
Code section 105-106 to establish as "an affirmative defense" that
the personal property causing the plaintiff's injury had been
"substantially altered, other than normal wear and tear, after sale
from its condition when sold and such alteration was the proximate
cause of the injury sustained.' ' 47
"' S.B. 513 (1978).
"' Id. The act specifies that it is to become effective upon its approval by the Governor or
upon its becoming law without his approval. The first reports are to be made in 1979.
" S.B. 514 (1978). The act specifies its effective date as March 1, 1979.
1 Actually. alI threomeaueu ;wuld xpressly repeal Code section 105-106 and reenact it
as thus changed.
"' 239 Ga. 657, 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977). See note 118 supra.
"' H.B. 1327 (1978). Thus, this measure would add the word "death" to "injury" in Code
section 105-106 and expressly include actions brought under the wrongful death statute. The
measure states that it becomes effective upon its approval by the Governor or upon its
becoming law without his approval.
' GA. CODE section 105-1301 (1933). See note 117 supra.
"' H.B. 1327 (1978). This part of the measure also would become effective upon its ap-
proval by the Governor or upon its becoming law without his approval.
",7 S.B. 511 (1978). This measure specifies no date of taking effect, hence its effective date
would presumably be July 1, 1978.
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Finally, the remaining enactment would prohibit commencing
any action under Code section 105-106 "with respect to an injury
after 10 years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption
of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the
injury."' 49
Whether the Governor will approve all, some, or none of these
enactments remains to be seen. Additionally unknowable, therefore,
is the exact future formulation of Code section 105-106, as well as
its posture once litigated and construed.'
V. CONCLUSION
Few courts in modern times are ever presented with a clean slate
upon which to write for an entire legal domain. Scarce is the subject
about which no cases have been decided and no questions have been
judicially treated in one fashion or another. Yet in early 1975, when
the Supreme Court of Georgia announced that Code section 105-106
imposed "a degree of strict liability," such was the situation thereby
structured. Whatever the errors of the past-indeed however ques-
tionable this announcement itself-the point was at least settled.
Prospective plaintiffs now learned that an additional action in tort
was available, immediate ramifications were highly foreseeable, and
the appellate courts were completely free to craft a logical and un-
's S.B. 512 (1978). This measure specifies no date of taking effect, hence its effective date
would presumably be July 1, 1978.
"' The indicated quandaries are worrisome ones. As previously noted, each of the three
proposed "amendments" to Code section 105-106 would actually expressly repeal the code
section and then reenact it as changed by that particular amendment. In setting out the
"new" code section, however, not one of the three measures refers to the changes made by
the other two. If all three measures are approved by the Governor, or permitted to become
law without his approval, the result appears to be three new, and different, versions of Code
section 105-106. In this event, the problem of determining the controlling version would
appear crucial. As noted, the measure which would incorporate a wrongful death action into
Code section 105-106 (H.B. 1327) would become effective upon date of approval. Both the
measure providing the "product alteration" defense (S.B. 511) and that establishing a ten-
year "statute of limitations" (S.B. 512) would only become effective on July 1, 1978. Would
these later amendments, on July 1, wipe the wrongful death incorporation out of Code section
105-106 yet again? Or, even if they did, would the additional amendment to the wrongful
death statute itself (Code section 105-1301) still be sufficient to accomplish the purpose of
permitting a wrongful death action in strict tort liability? Finally, what of the two measures
which would take effect on July 1? Could they both be given operation, or would the hap-
penstance of the order in which the Governor approved them determine the controlling
version of Code section 105-106?
Will the real Code section 105-106 please stand up?
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derstandable system of statutory strict products liability.
This survey depicts the results of the almost three-year period
which has since transpired. Let it suffice to observe that on a num-
ber of occasions these results have been neither logical nor under-
standable. The slate has been smudged. The plea here is neither
pro-plaintiff nor pro-defendant, but rather for thoughtful attention
to individual issues as they arise, with a larger concern for the
mosaic necessarily being created. This would not seem an unreason-
able plea. The subject is a vitally important one in Georgia law,
many unanswered questions about it yet remain, and the cases will
continue to come. In confronting them, fulsome forethought would
be a happy hallmark for the appellate courts-indeed, for the Gen-
eral Assembly itself.
Both the courts and the legislature must remember that a boggled
bar is not an effective bar.
